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RULES C AND B
When there is a Rule C arrest with a time charter agreement, with performance such as
paying hire, a maritime lien may exist against a charter before there is control over the
cargo.

Under Rule B attachment, if the respondent and agent for the charter are not
present within the district, attachment may proceed.

Navieros Inter-Americanos

v.

MV Vasilia. 120 F.3d 304 (1st Cir. 1997)

(Decided July 28, 1997)

On March 28, 1996 plaintiff-appellee Navieros Inter-Americanos ("Navieros"), a Florida
Corporation, entered into a fixed time charter with the defendant-appellants. Navieros, the
charterer, believed the vessel, the MN Vasilia Express, was owned by Royal United Shipping,
Inc. ("Royal United"), and registered in the West Indies. However, it was owned by Vasilia, Inc.,
a corporation closely linked to Royal United.
Navieros chartered the vessel for two round trips between Florida and Guatemala, with
an option for a third. The trips were to total approximately 28 days at $2,300 per day. The charter
party stated that the charter was to commence upon the vessel's arrival at the pilot station in Port
Everglades, Florida where Navieros' cargo would be loaded.
On March 28, 1996, Kenneth Coleman ("Coleman"), President of Navieros, boarded the
vessel while docked in Miami to discuss stowage plans. While aboard, Coleman also instructed
the captain to berth his vessel in Port Everglades at Pier 19, rather than at the pilot station. How
ever, prior to arrival at Pier 19 the vessel stopped for repairs at Bicentennial Park in Miami. Dur
ing this period, Navieros ordered fuel for the vessel and confirmed the reservation in Port
Everglades.
While the vessel was delayed, Royal United entered into a second time charter party with
Cornet Lines Agency, Inc. ("Cornet"), which was unaware of the existing charter party with
Navieros. The Comet charter party was to begin April 4, at $2,630 per day for 30 days and was
for the carriage of cargo between San Juan. Puerto Rico and Venezuela.
Upon arrival in San Juan on April 13, the United States Coast Guard detained the vessel
for a litany of safety violations. Navieros heard of the vessel's detention and filed a complaint in
the federal district court in Puerto Rico. The initial action was in rem against the vessel based on
breach of a time charter agreement and to enforce a maritime lien.
On April 18, the court in an ex parte proceeding, ordered the arrest of the vessel pursuant
to Rule C of the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Under Rule C, "the holder of a maritime lien can bring an in rem
action against the vessel subject to the lien." The court stated Navieros made a prima facia
showing of a maritime lien against the vessel. On April 24, Navieros amended its complaint,
moving for attachment of the vessel under Supplemental Rule B. Rule B states, if the defendant
"shall not be found within the district," the admiralty plaintiff can acquire quasi in rem
jurisdiction over the defendant by attaching property in the district. In an affidavit submitted by
Navieros, the defendant, Royal United, could not be found within the district. Soon after,
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Navieros again amended the complaint to include V asilia as an in personam defendant along with
Royal United. The court then set a trial date of May 23.
Vasilia argued that the Rule C arrest was improper because there was no maritime lien.
Vasilia stated the charter party agreement was still executory since the vessel had not yet been
delivered to Navieros at the time of the breach. Vasilia also argued the Rule B attachment was
invalid because Vasilia appointed an agent who could be found within the district for service of
process on its behalf.
On May 29, the U.S. District Court concluded that the Rule C and Rule B attachments
were valid. The court stated that the vessel was delivered to the charterer when the ship's captain
accepted Coleman's instructions to proceed to Pier 19 at Port Everglades for loading. Therefore,
under Rule C, Navieros had a valid maritime lien against the vessel. The U.S. District Court also
upheld Rule B because Vasilia, a Liberian corporation, had no corporate presence in the district
and its eleventh hour appointment of an agent was only a strategic appointment to elude attach
ment.
The U.S. District Court entered a judgment against the vessel and the two in personam
defendants. The vessel was to be sold at auction by the United States Marshal. The total judgment
against Vasilia amounted to $593,470.30. Vasilia appealed, contesting the validity of the arrest
under Rule C and the attachment under Rule B.
To have an in rem proceeding under Rule C, a plaintiff must have a maritime lien against
the defendant's vessel. See Bunn

v.

Global Marine, Inc., 428 F.2d 40, 48 n. 10 (5th Cir. 1970).

However, the executory contract doctrine specifies that charterers have no maritime lien until
performance under the contract begins. Krauss Bros. Lumber Co.

v.

Dimon S.S. Corp. (The

Pacific Cedar), 290 U.S. 117, 121, 54, S.Ct. 105, 106, 78 L.Ed. 216 (1933).
The district court relied on E.A.S.T Inc..

v.

MIV Alaia. 673 F. Supp. 796, 802 (E.D. La

1987), affd, 876 F.2d 1168 (5th Cir.1989), wherein it was stated that with time charters, as
opposed to voyage charters; a maritime lien may exist before there is control of the cargo on the
vessel. This is so because under a time charter the ship owner puts his vessel, master, and crew
to service for a named period. The charterer must begin his performance, "well before cargo is,
if ever, loaded on the vessel by paying hire, appointing and funding a port agent and arranging
and paying for pilotage, tug, assistance and line h andlers and all else necessary to berth the vessel
in order to load cargo." Id. at 803.
The U.S. Court of Appeals held that the district court had not erred in its decision because
performance of the charter clearly began when the ship's captain accepted Coleman's instructions
in Miami. At that moment the charter could no longer be considered executory. Thus, the Court
of Appeals ruled that both the maritime lien against the vessel and the Rule C arrest were proper
and affirmed the district's court ruling.
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